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1 Planning policy is a major tool determining development outcomes and shaping the built
environment.  It  is  commonly  used  to  build  better  places  and  promote  sustainable
communities and development. However, in some extreme cases, the struggle over land
has taken precedence. This is especially evident in the Middle East and particularly in the
Israeli Palestinian conflict. The continued international interest and media coverage from
the region places the local geopolitical issues in the world’s spotlight; however, it rarely
looks at the underlying conditions for the emergence of these turbulent circumstances.
This paper affirms that planning policy holds a fundamental impact on the positive social
and spatial development of urban areas; however, in some extreme cases, the politics of
conflict produce different conditions as the case of Jerusalem will reveal. 
2 Several factors distinguish Jerusalem from other cities. Firstly, it is an important religious
center for  three of  the world’s  monotheistic  religions;  and secondly,  it  is  claimed as
national  capital  by two contenders,  placing it  in the vortex of  the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.  The multidimensional  nature  of  its  divisions  places  Jerusalem in a  uniquely
difficult  and symbolic  situation when attempting to resolve its  internal  and external
tensions. Jerusalem is the largest and poorest city in Israel today. At the end of 2010, the
population of Jerusalem numbered 789,000. The “Jewish and Other” population totaled
504,000,  and the  Arab  population  totaled  285,000  (Choshen  et al.  2012).  As  widely
documented and analyzed (see for example: Dumper 1997; Bollens 2000; Hasson 2007), a
significant spatial turning point of Israel’s geopolitical conditions started after June 1967,
when  Israel  occupied  East  Jerusalem  with  other  territories.  Following  this,  despite
international objections, the government of Israel issued the Municipalities Ordinance
(Amendment No. 6) Law, 5727–1967 applying Israeli law to East Jerusalem (Lapidoth 2006).
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As a result,  Israel  annexed Palestinian land and declared the city of  Jerusalem as its
united capital city. 
3 The total area of land annexed by Israel to Jerusalem in 1967 is 71 km2 (approx.18,000
acres), of which 6.5 km2  belonged to the East Jerusalem municipality (Jerusalem under
Jordanian Rule) including the Old City, before 1967. The rest of the area was taken from
the jurisdictions of 28 Palestinian villages surrounding the city. As a result of the 1967
occupation and annexation, the new municipal boundaries tripled in size from 38 km2 to
109 km2.  The area of the enlarged Jerusalem municipality was increased again in May
1993 and reached 126 km2 (approx. 32,000 acres) (for more details see: Rokem 2010).
 
Jerusalem – in the Context of ’Ethno-Nationally
Contested Cities’ 
4 All  cities  around the world experience and contain changing levels  of  fragmentation
formed by local and global circumstances producing socio-economic, cultural, and ethnic
divisions. Some of the influential seminal works on cities have explored such phenomena.
One  of  the  earliest  examples  was  Friedrich  Engels’  study  of  the  working  classes  in
Manchester  (See  Engels  1844).  Contemporary  examples  of  similar  analyses  abound,
including: Mike Davies’ account of ‘Fortress Urbanism” in Los Angeles (1990); Iris Marion
Young’s notion of “living together in difference,” and Ali Madanipour’s analysis of social
exclusion in European cities (1998) – and numerous others. However, the former scholars’
main  foci  lay  in  cities  devoid  of  the  extreme  conditions  of  ethno-nationalistic  and
religious divisions. These attributes only exist in a selected minority of places; Hasson
and Kouba (1996: 114) categorize this group of cities as polarized and politically divided.
They claim that the conflicts in these cities are multidimensional and that within the
basic  religious-ethnic  division,  there are  layers  of  national  division,  geographic
segregation,  and  economic  stratification.  While  Bollens  (1998;  2000)  recognizes  the
existence of complex and varying dynamics of conflict in ethnically polarized cities, he
does maintain that issues of ethnic identity and nationalistic claims of sovereignty over
territory are common issues to these places. Kotek (1999: 228) applies the term “frontier
city” to this  group of  places,  differentiating it  from “multiethnic” or  “multicultural”
cities. By “frontier” Kotek means that the divisions are not only economic or ethnic but
rather  that  they  are  a  combination  of  their  location  on  fault-lines  between  ethnic,
religious,  and ideological  wholes.  Such conurbations have been a major challenge for
urban policy  and planning  (Sharkansky  1996;  Bollens  1998,  2000;  Hasson 2002,  2005;
Kmihi 2005; et al.). 
5 Moreover, the roles they play in wider national conflicts tend to extend the occurrences
within them much further than their local  territorial  geography.  Some of the widely
known examples  of  such  cities  include  Belfast,  Nicosia,  Berlin,  Sarajevo,  Beirut,  and
Brussels; however, there is a common agreement in the literature that Jerusalem typifies
one of the most complex urban territories and that a resolution there does not seem
within reach (Sharkansky 1996; Sennett 1999; Bollens 1998, 2000; Safier 2001; Sorkin 2002;
Hasson 2003, 2005). Jerusalem contains divisions on several grounds: historical (Israel and
Palestine),  ethnic  and  religious  (Jews  and  Arabs),  ethno-national  (Palestinians  and
Israelis),  and linguistic (Hebrew and Arabic).  The multidimensionality of the divisions
puts Jerusalem in a uniquely difficult situation when trying to resolve its internal and
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external tensions. Important recent work on cities within ethno-national conflicts have
tended  to  privilege  issues  of  national  control  and  territory  and  have  not  engaged
seriously enough with the urban dynamics concealed beneath the more visible national
surface (Benvenisti 1996; Dumper 1997; Bollens 2000; Yiftachel & Yacobi 2004). 
 
Urban Planning in Jerusalem – Historical Overview 
6 To comprehend the complexity of Jerusalem’s spatial and social fabric, it is important to
briefly outline its 20th century history. In 1917, the rule of Jerusalem was taken over from
the  late  Ottoman Empire  by  the  British  Mandate. The  shift  in  the  governing  power
radically altered the position of the city from a remote provincial town at the edge of the
vast  Ottoman Empire  to  the  capital  of  the  British  Mandate  in  Palestine.  The  British
Mandate planning policy strengthened the position of the Old City and developed the
New City in relation to its historical core. The British established new plans and erected
monumental buildings in Jerusalem. Some of the most gifted urban planners of the time
prepared master plans for the city’s development, some of the more dominant ones being
Ashbee & Geddes Scheme (1922) the Holliday Scheme (1934) and the Kendall  Scheme
(1944). After the end of the 30-year British Mandate and the creation of the state of Israel
as a result of the1948 War1, Jerusalem was physically divided into two separate parts: the
East (Jordanian side) and the West (Israeli side). For the next 19 years, the two sides of the
city developed individually as entirely separate entities with a militarized border zone
constructed along the cease-fire line through the city’s historical heart by the Old City
walls. 
7 Two differing planning objectives were dominant in the Israeli  planning of Jerusalem
before 1967. One treated Jerusalem as a weak frontier city on a hostile border with the
Jordanian  Hashemite  Kingdom.  This  resulted  in  shifting  planning  westwards  and
neglecting the old divided historical center. The other objective took the assumption that
Jerusalem and the west side of the city center should be strengthened to symbolize the
Israeli capital. Generally the divided city was a stable realty: “the separation line became
a fixed fact in the minds of the people” (Schwied 1986: 109). Jerusalem officially became a
divided city. On each side of the borderline, both Jordanians and Israelis began to develop
their part of Jerusalem. The Jordanians concentrated mainly on expanding their suburbs
beyond the Old City walls, mostly to the North (Sharon 1973: 132). The first master plan
for  the  Israeli  part  of  Jerusalem,  Scheme  1950,  planned  for  the  expansion  and
development of the city. The succeeding 1959 Outline Scheme (master plan) adopted most
of  the Scheme 1950 regulations  and is  the last  statutory authorized master  plan for
Jerusalem until today (further details about this in the contemporary overview below).
Planning  during  the  next  19  years  concentrated  on  the  development  of  new
neighborhoods on the western outskirts of the city with the growth there being infinitely
greater than on the Jordanian side. Israeli areas close to the borderline were mostly slums
and were not regarded as safe places to live due to frequent sniper fire and hostility of the
Jordanians. The 1950 and 1959 master plans reflect the reality embedded in the planners’
belief foreseeing the city will remain divided with no indications of any future hope for
changes in the status quo.
8 The 1968 master plan, prepared in 1966-67 by Hashimshoni, Schwied, and Hashimshoni
prior to the outcome of the 1967 War, planned a “reunified” Jerusalem at a time when it
was against all expectations and common planning objectives, challenging the common
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state of mind that held the city’s division as permanent (Hashimshoni et al. 1972). By the
time the 1968 master plan was ready for submission, the 1967 War had ended and the
urban space was once again under one planning authority – thus the geographical reality
had generated conditions increasing the potentiality of the plan: “Until 1967, Jerusalem
was a sleepy town. Its issues were considered as mainly local municipal issues – important
issues, but local. After 1967, the issues were different, the issues became national politics”
(Schwied 1986: 112).
9 As  a  consequence  of  the  1967  War2 between Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors,  a  single
political entity once more controlled the city of Jerusalem: Israel. The Israeli government
through  its  Ministry  of  Interior  and  the  Jerusalem  Municipality  made  an  almost
immediate  effort  to  shape  the  urban  fabric  according  to  its  needs  and  political
aspirations. Israel,  with the Ministry of Interior and the Jerusalem Municipality as its
main legislative arms, has been responsible for urban planning and policy for the last 45
years, keeping a clear separation between Israeli and Palestinian living areas clearly




Map of the current Jerusalem Municipality boundary (Palestinian neighborhoods marked
in brown and Jewish neighborhoods in blue).
Source: Arab Studies Society – Mapping & GIS Department 2008.
10 The Israeli planning policy after the 1967 War was to effect an overall “reunification” of
the city, putting emphasis on the newly united historical center. “Early urban planning
proposals considered the reorientation and eventual linkage of the two major business
centers of West and East Jerusalem” (Romann and Weingrod 1991: 41). The general aim of
the aforementioned 1968 Master plan was “[to] establish an urban structure for a unified
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city, freely accessible both locally and internationally, functionally suitable as the Capital
of the state of Israel” (Sharon 1973: 135). The 1968 Plan demonstrated the same spatial
awareness of Jerusalem’s special qualities, which were common in the mandatory plans of
the past, and responded with restricting construction and leaving open spaces around the
Old City. Special emphasis was put on the historical nucleus. A strict control of building
heights around the Old City walls was maintained from previous plans. 
11 The focal guidelines of the 1968 Master plan evolved around using planning policy and
growth  to  integrate  the  city’s  infrastructure  and  development.  The  Jerusalem
Municipality, within days after the 1967 reunification, started the “integration of services
and infrastructure” between the two sides of the city (Dumper 1993: 81).
12 Mayor  Teddy  Kollek,  who would  become the  central  figure  in  the  development  and
management of Jerusalem for the next quarter of century, established an international
panel of experts in the early 1970s to review the 1968 Master Plan and take part in the
building of “reunified Jerusalem” (Wasserstein 2001: 217). The mayor held high hopes for
the planning and development of central Jerusalem: 
We are  deeply  immersed  in  the  city  planning  to  improve  the  quality  of  life  in
Jerusalem.  Our  present  planning  focuses  upon  the  Old  City  and  its  immediate
surroundings. We are developing a green belt around the Old City at great expense.
Jerusalem is, I believe, the only city in modern times to create, by purchase, a large
central green area such as was preserved by the Boston Common, New York City
Central Park, London’s Hyde Park, and the Bois de Boulogne of Paris more than a
century ago (Kollek 1980: 12). 
13 When referring back to the British Mandate plans for the city, David Guggenheim, one of
the architects involved in the planning of the historical center after 1967, notes: “There
was  a  clear  interest  in  developing the  central  area  around the  Old  City  as  a  bridge
between East  and West  Jerusalem,  erasing  the  old  division line”  (David  Guggenheim
Interview, 11 June 2006). The planning of the city center evolved around the uniqueness
of Jerusalem, the centrality of the holy city, and the desire to create a buffer zone that
would be made an archaeological zone and open space surrounding the Old City (Turner
2003: 97). However, Israeli urban planning discourse in Jerusalem, as mentioned earlier,
has been influenced heavily by the wider national political conflict. Since 1967, the main
policy has been the drive to unite the city under Israeli sovereignty as indicated in the
1968 Master plan (discussed in detail below). 
 
Urban Planning in Jerusalem – Contemporary
Overview
14 Indeed, as the historical overview above has revealed, since 1967, urban planning policy
has  been a  tool  used to  spatially  enhance the  dominance of  the  Israeli  Municipality
control over urban space, thus asserting its sovereignty. Yet, beyond the Israeli rhetoric
declaring Jerusalem as a unified city, its planning policies have reflected the paradigm of
a colonial city; both state and city governments have pursued the same general policy,
which  has  persistently  promoted  the  Judaization  – that  is,  the  expansion  of  Jewish
political, territorial, demographic, and economic control – of Jerusalem (Yacobi, 2012). In
more details,  over the last  46 years,  Israel  has used its  military might and economic
power to relocate borders and form boundaries, grant and deny rights and resources,
shift  populations,  and  reshape  the  Occupied  Territories  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring
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Jewish control. In the case of East Jerusalem, two complementary strategies have been
implemented by Israel: the construction of a massive outer ring of Jewish neighborhoods
which now host over half the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and the containment of all
Palestinian  development,  implemented  through  housing  demolitions,  legally  banning
Palestinian  construction  and  development,  and  the  prevention  of  Palestinian
immigration to the city. 
15 Following the construction of the separation wall (also known as “the security barrier”),
Israel is in the process of annexing 160 km2 of the Occupied Territories in addition to the
70 km2 annexed immediately after its occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967. This area
includes the Ma’ale Adumim and Giv’at Ze’ev Settlements, the Gush Etzion Settlement
Bloc, and the Beitar Illit Settlement. The wall enforces Israel’s de facto political borders in
Jerusalem and transforms it into the largest city in Israel geographically. On the other
hand, the  geographic  continuity  and  the  functional  integration  of  the  Palestinian
neighborhoods are damaged and these neighborhoods are completely isolated from their
hinterland (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002).
16 Israel claims that the formal reason for building the wall is to prevent suicide bombers
from entering the city from the West Bank. The building of the wall has caused severe
disruption in the daily life of the Palestinian population living on the West Bank and
depending on East Jerusalem for employment and commercial activities. In reality, the
result has been a mass migration of Palestinians from the West Bank re-locating inside
the municipality (walled) borders. The building of the wall has vigorously changed the
demographical balance, increasing the Palestinian percentage in Jerusalem. Ironically,
this  contradicts  keeping  a  Jewish  majority  in  the  city,  the  main  priority  of  Israel’s
planning policy in the past 46 years. Following the expansion of the city at the end of the
1967 War, the total population of Jerusalem stood at 266,000 inhabitants, 74% Jews and
26% Arabs and others (Chosen 2005: 11). The Palestinian sector has constantly expanded
compared to  the Israeli  one.  It  is  forecasted that  in the year  2020,  the city’s  Jewish
population will decrease to 62.2% while the Arab and others population will consist of
37.8% of the city’s inhabitants (Chosen 2005: 15). The demographical balance in Jerusalem
has  been  in  constant  change.  The  increase  in  the  Palestinian  population  stands  in
contradiction to the Israeli government’s and the Jerusalem local municipality’s policy to
maintain  a  Jewish  majority  in  the  city – what  has  been  termed  “the  battle  over
demography.” (Fenster, 2004: 96).
17 Another central issue in Jerusalem is the question of sovereignty (Benvenisti 1985 et al. 1;
Baskin & Twite 1993: 16; Klein 2003: 54). This concept is one of the most complex and
controversial  notions  in  constitutional  and  international  law.  “Sovereignty  generally
refers to a situation of absolute political authority over a given territory” (Baskin & Twite
1993: 11). Indeed, as a result, most of the world’s nations and organizations, including the
United Nations, are disinclined to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  This is
because the city’s Eastern parts are seen as an occupied territory that is not a legitimate
part of Israel but of the West Bank3. The East Jerusalem population was granted special
status after the 1967 War and given Israeli residency. The purported aim was to integrate
them  into  the  city  while  claiming  they  were  to  receive  equal  legal  rights.  This
differentiates them from other West Bank residents and technically gives them the right
to vote in the municipal elections as well as the use of the city’s social services. East
Jerusalemites  commonly  claim  the  municipality  is  illegitimate  and  have  since  1967
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expressed their protest by refraining from voting in municipal elections (Romann and
Weingrod 1991: 193; Hasson and Kouba 1996: 120).
18 Since 1967, the policy employed by the Jerusalem municipality has been affected by the
Israeli  national  political  discourse.  The principal  Israeli  policy  has  been “reunifying”
Jerusalem under Israeli  sovereignty while the Palestinian Eastern population sees the
integration of East Jerusalem as illegal “annexation.” In ethnically divided cities, urban
planning policy can take a major role in enhancing spatial and social division (Bollens
2000).  The unequal funding of urban planning and construction projects between the
Eastern and the Western parts has resulted in a city split into two distinct growth poles,
with the crossover parts and old border areas remaining mainly neglected division points
between the two sides. 
19 Up until today, planning and development in Jerusalem has been officially determined by
the last statutory authorized master plan dating from 1959. The 1959 Scheme, prepared at
the  time when Jerusalem was  a  divided  city,  includes  only  the  Western  part  of  the
pre-1967 Israeli Jerusalem. Therefore, it has little relevance in determining planning and
development in the current conditions. This means that without an updated master plan,
for almost 50 years, the Municipality, the Ministry of Interior, and other government
departments  have  shared  the  development  and  planning  without  an  overall  legally
binding document. The recent “Master plan 2000” (analyzed in further detail below), was
published in 2004 and has to date not received statutory approval. The reason no master
plan has been legally approved over the years was a lack of agreement among policy
makers. Consequently, the actual development of Jerusalem has had little relation to the
1959  Scheme  and  has  relied  on  various  local  detailed  plans  without  any  overall
coordination of  the city’s  development.  This  has  manifested itself  in planning policy
incongruity and ambiguity resulting in lack in overall plans to pursue the city’s growth.
20 As mentioned above, a new outline plan for Jerusalem, the “Jerusalem Master plan 2000”4
(Fig. 2), is the first comprehensive plan to include both East and West Jerusalem and, as
such, it addresses Israeli governmental policy with regards to maintaining a demographic
balance in an undivided city. The underlying principle of the Israeli planning policy in
Jerusalem is to establish a large, unified city with a dominant Jewish majority. The plan
proposes a population objective of 60% Jewish to 40% Palestinian, maintaining such a
demographic balance in the future. 
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Fig. 2.
Jerusalem Master plan 2000.
Source: Jerusalem Municipality Planning Department.
21 The  Jerusalem Master  plan  2000  is  an  improvement  of  existing  plans.  However,  the
benefits the Palestinian residents will derive from the plan are nominal. Thus, while the
plan provides new potential for residential development, it simultaneously introduces a
number of building restrictions that, de facto, make it almost impossible for residents to
actually make use of these new possibilities. 
22 For example, the Jerusalem Master plan 2000 does not determine detailed land usages,
and therefore cannot be used to deliver building permits. In order to develop new areas
contained in the plan, there is a need for detailed local plan which regulates the type of
land usage  which  is  legally  required  to  receive  a  building  permit.  However,  for  the
majority of the Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem, there are no valid local outline plans,
consequently, these areas will remain neglected. 
23 The Jerusalem Master plan 2000 planning approval process to date has been politically
contested by Israeli decision makers. In 2004, the first version of the Jerusalem Master
plan 2000 was made available to the public for consultation. In this version, a total area of
approximately 11.8 km2 was allocated for new development of Jerusalem neighborhoods.
Of this, only approximately 2.3 km2 (less than 20% of the area) was allocated to Palestinian
neighborhoods (as opposed to 9.5 km2 for Israeli neighborhoods). 
24 In April 2007, the plan was approved by the local planning committee and handed over to
the district planning committee for approval. From mid-2007 until May 2008, the district
planning committee held intensive discussions and eventually approved the deposition of
the plan for public objections. Following this phase, the planners were expected to make
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the required changes and the plan was supposed to be deposited for final review. This has
yet to happen. 
25 Members of the Jerusalem city council were the cause of the delay. They submitted a
detailed  document  to  the  Minister  of  Interior  claiming  that  the  approved  plan
discriminated against the Israeli population, in favor of the Palestinian population. The
Minister of Interior holds overall responsibility for planning policy and stands at the head
of the planning hierarchy. The Minister ordered the head of the District Planning Office
to delay the approval. Hence, the reason the Jerusalem Master plan 2000 has not been
legally approved is lack of agreement amongst Israeli policy makers.
26 It is interesting to note that the largest mobilization by Israeli citizens against a single
development project in Jerusalem (with a total of 16,000 planning objections presented to
the planning commission) was organized against the so-called “Safdie Plan” (Outline Plan
37/1, foreseeing the construction of about 20,000 housing units over an area of 26.6 km2
of open space to the west of Jerusalem), mostly by environmentalist organizations; since
2006, the protest has been so far successful in sinking the plan. The housing crisis in West
Jerusalem prompts Israelis to use land in the eastern part of the city for themselves; in
fact, the government approved outline plans for the disputed “E1” area – a relatively
vacant part of the Eastern outskirts of the city on the West Bank. The area is crucial in
connecting the north and south parts of the West Bank and crucial in any future creation
of a viable Palestinian state. 
 
Conclusion
27 Israeli planning policy in Jerusalem constructs the social world in an explicit approach,
shaping social practices. These practices enable particular “privileged speakers” (Israeli
decision makers) to manage and dominate planning policy and development. 
28 There  has  been a  long-standing  position in  the  literature  that  Jerusalem has  a  slim
prospect of becoming a truly open and united city. This paper acknowledges the view that
under the current political circumstances, there is little hope to see a complete solution
to the Jerusalem problem. Even so, the assertion made by Scott Bollens (2000) that urban
policymaking should not await a larger peace process but can be a powerful tool in local
conflict management and a facilitator of more profound political solutions is important
and relevant to the case of Jerusalem. In this sense, urban planning and policy should be
viewed  as  distinct  and  essential  instruments  in  reaching  better  cooperation  in  the
absence of national overarching policy solutions. However, in the last 46 years planning
policy in Jerusalem has been dominated by the local municipality, backed by the central
Israeli government, it has been employed as a tool to implement and maintain a Jewish
majority in the city. However, on the ground, this overarching goal has predominantly
failed. 
29 The development of the Jewish areas in Jerusalem continues by expanding the Israeli
housing, commerce, and employment sectors, based on approved local outline plans in
both the Eastern and the Western parts  of  the city.  At  the same time,  there are no
approved local outline plans designated in the Palestinian neighborhoods; the economy of
East  Jerusalem  will  continue  to  depend  on  that  of  West  Jerusalem  and  will  remain
dilapidated.
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30 There is  an urgent need to move towards a use of urban planning to foster genuine
resolutions in Jerusalem. This requires a major shift from the dominant Israeli one-sided
planning policy to a localized shared dimension. In the current turbulent conditions in
the Middle East, such a shift seems evermore remote. However, there is a need to move
from one-sided planning objectives to actual planning implementation that encourages
transformation  benefiting  all  the  city’s  residents  prior  to  any  long  awaited  overall
resolution. 
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NOTES
1. War of Independence (Israeli name) or Naqba “The disaster” (Palestinian name); to simplify,
the common term 1948 War will be used in the following study.
2. The 1967 Six Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors ended in the occupation by Israel
of the West Bank, Gaza strip and Golan Heights. 
3. The West Bank, including Eastern Jerusalem, was taken from Jordan by Israel in the 1967 War. 
4. Jerusalem Master plan 2000 – Jerusalem Municipality Planning Department – (Hebrew): http://
www.jerusalem.muni.il/jer_sys/publish/HtmlFiles/13029/results_pub_id=24819.html
Politics and Conflict in a Contested City
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
12
ABSTRACTS
This paper asserts  that urban planning is  a  critical  tool  in designing an effective,  attractive,
functioning city. A strong urban planning system provides a way of balancing the interests of
various groups (public and private) and communities within the city – under an umbrella that
protects the public interest, and allows the city to flourish. In Jerusalem, where planning and
ethno-national politics merge, the system of urban planning has been used over the last few
decades to achieve Israeli national political goals, bolstering the Israeli population and its control
of  the  land in  the  city,  and limiting the urban development  of,  and control  of  land by,  the
Palestinian  community.  The  paper  starts  with  a  brief  review  of  contested  cities  literature,
continues with an analysis of Jerusalem’s urban planning history and concludes with a more
contemporary analysis of planning and politics in the contested city of Jerusalem. 
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